[Adta] Fwd: DIALOGUES--member's book review

[Cynthia BERROL]

Ilene, 
Thanks for posting this provocative review re mirror
neurons vis-à-vis "mind reading" and
"intersubjectivity", et cetera. It's important for us
to reflect on all aspects of significant issues such
as these.
Cynthia  


--- Ilene Serlin <iserlin at ileneserlin.com> wrote:

> 
> > For those of us interested in mirror neurons....
> 
> Ilene
> > From Bill Adams, Ph.D. (psychology)
> >
> > Innate Intersubjectivity and the Science of Mind
> Reading
> > A review of
> On Being Moved: From Mirror Neurons to
> Empathy
> > by Stein Bråten (Ed.)
> > Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2007. 333 pp. ISBN
> 978-90-272-5204-3.  
> > $149.00
> > Reviewed by
> >
> > William A. Adams
> >
> > http://members.bainbridge.net/~bill.adams
> >
> > Stein Bråten announces a “paradigmatic
> revolution� (p. 2) in  
> > developmental psychology, described in 17 chapters
> from various  
> > authors in On Being Moved: From Mirror Neurons to
> Empathy. The  
> > revolution is the discovery of the human mind's
> ability to enter  
> > into another person's experience and participate
> in it.
> >
> > Intersubjectivity is that empathic connection
> between at least two  
> > sentient beings. Surprisingly, this volume gives
> no clear  
> > definition, only a plethora of examples
> illustrating sympathy,  
> > empathy, language competence, perspective taking,
> imitation,  
> > cooperation, turn taking, movement coordination,
> and understanding  
> > of another person's meaning, intentions, or
> emotions. What do all  
> > those things have in common? I venture to say mind
> reading.
> > The revolution of this book is not the overthrow
> of Freud and  
> > Piaget, as Bråten believes, but the assertions
> that mind reading is  
> > a scientifically measurable phenomenon and that
> the human capacity  
> > for it is built in. The book implicitly adopts a
> nativist stance  
> > and, through consideration of so-called “mirror
> neurons�  
> > dedicated to imitation, argues for the
> naturalization of mind  
> > reading, or intersubjectivity.
> > For those of us nursed on the milk of behaviorism,
> the claim of  
> > scientific proof for mind reading is shocking. To
> say it is an  
> > inborn faculty is heretical. Even the cognitive
> revolution of the  
> > 1960s, which legitimized making inferences from
> behavioral  
> > performance to mental capacity, did not anticipate
> this.
> > The Evidence for Intersubjectivity
> >
> > Bråten and Colwyn Trevarthen organize the
> evidence into three  
> > cumulative stages of development. Primary
> intersubjectivity is seen  
> > in infants from birth to a few months old. Andrew
> Meltzoff and  
> > Rechele Brooks cite, for example, an early study
> demonstrating that  
> > an infant only 42 minutes after birth can stick
> out his or her  
> > tongue in imitation of an adult. That suggests
> some kind of an  
> > innate social understanding.
> >
> > Pier Ferrari and Vittorio Gallese show a
> photograph of a one-week- 
> > old macaque monkey doing the same thing—sticking
> out its tongue in  
> > imitation of an adult human's gesture. It's a
> spooky picture if you  
> > accept the idea that it demonstrates innate social
> understanding  
> > between individuals. How psychologically close are
> we to these  
> > monkeys, anyway?
> > Meltzoff and Brooks also describe a series of
> elegant experiments  
> > in gaze following with human infants of 12 to 18
> months. The  
> > infants turned their heads to follow the gaze of
> an adult and then  
> > visually inspected the target the adult looked at,
> but not if the  
> > adult's eyes were closed, indicating that the
> infants followed the  
> > adult's visual intentionality, not just the head
> movement. When the  
> > adult wore a blindfold, the infants did not
> understand its  
> > consequence. Sometimes they followed the head
> turn, sometimes not.  
> > But after having their own field of view blocked
> by a black  
> > curtain, they subsequently gaze-followed only when
> the adult was  
> > not blindfolded—demonstrating, it seems, that
> they generalized  
> > from their own experience to a more sophisticated
> understanding of  
> > the adult's mental experience.
> > Daniel Stern writes about his now-classic
> description of synchrony  
> > (Stern, 1985), the coordinated interaction between
> infant and  
> > caregiver (typically mother) in face-to-face play.
> The mother makes  
> > baby talk, highly intonated noises, and facial
> gestures, and the  
> > infant responds with smiles, gurgles, and
> vocalizations. The timing  
> > of their coordinated interaction is very tight,
> like singers in a  
> > duet, as they become emotionally attuned. The
> capacity for such  
> > precise interaction is probably inborn, but its
> exercise teaches  
> > the child how to read and express emotions and
> forms the basis for  
> > later social skills, including language
> acquisition. These “proto- 
> > conversations,� as Stern calls them, provide
> access to other minds.
> > In the second developmental stage,
> intersubjectivity is defined by  
> > emotional referencing, when the infant looks to
> the mother to see  
> > if a situation is dangerous or safe, and by what
> Bråten calls  
> > “participant perception,� demonstrated when an
> infant  
> > reciprocates the caregiver's spoon feeding or
> tries to help the  
> > caregiver. Meltzoff and Brooks review studies in
> which an adult  
> > showed 18-month-olds an unsuccessful attempt to
> pull apart a toy.  
> > The toddlers then spontaneously pulled it apart
> more often than did  
> > controls who saw no demonstration. The authors
> conclude that  
> > “infants seemed to `see through' the surface
> behavior to the  
> > underlying goals or intentions of the actor� (p.
> 161).
> > The third level of intersubjectivity is language
> mediated, when  
> > children develop a “theory of mind� to take
> another's point of  
> > view. At this age a child can pretend to be
> pleased with a  
> > disappointing gift. Jokes and symbolic games also
> demonstrate  
> > tertiary intersubjectivity. The development of
> intersubjectivity  
> > thereafter merges with general cognitive
> development.
> > The evidence for intersubjectivity is not news to
> anyone working in  
> > developmental psychology, although the idea that
> it is inborn is  
> > still challenging. The evidence of prelinguistic,
> preconceptual  
> > intersubjectivity in infants argues for
> innateness, since it is not  
> > plausible that infants or nonhuman primates could
> be logically  
> > deducing the state of other minds from behavioral
> observation.
> > Enter Mirror Neurons
> >
> > Sealing the deal on the nativist argument is a
> fine chapter by  
> > Ferrari and Gallese describing and elaborating on
> the discovery of  
> > mirror neurons (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese,
> 2001) in macaque  
> > monkeys. These brain neurons discharge when the
> monkey performs  
> > goal-oriented hand actions such as grasping an
> object but also when  
> 
=== message truncated ===>
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